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SECURITIES LAW-CONSIDERATION OF TAX BENEFITS IN PRI­
VATE DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5-Salcer v. Envicon Eq­
uities, 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984). 
The role of tax benefits in securities law tax shelter fraud litiga­
tion has received substantial attention in the courts. 1 In Salcer v. En­
vicon Equities,2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that 
1. Some have considered tax benefits relevant: SaIcer v. Envicon Equities, 744 F.2d 
935, 943 (2d Cir. 1984) (Rule IOb-5 real estate tax shelter fraud action, court held tax 
benefits must be considered); Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 440 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(state law securities fraud action; court held tax benefits may be relevant to damage compu­
tation); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982) rehearing en bane 768 
F.2d 949 (1985)(suit brought under Rule IOb-5 for a fraudulent tax shelter; held that when 
applying a rescissionary measure of damages, tax benefits should be considered); Dupuy v. 
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1025 (5th Cir.) (suit brought under Rule 1Ob-5 for misrepresenta­
tion in sale of stock; held tax benefits should be considered in the calculation of damages), 
cerro denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Gardner v. Surnamer, 608 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 n.3 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985) (action under Rule IOb-5 for misrepresentation, court stated tax benefits are rele­
vant when considering damages); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(action for rescission under the federal securities laws where tax benefits are relevant and 
plaintiffs have placed their incomes in issue, court ordered production of returns for consid­
eration); Houlihan v. Anderson Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978) (Rule lOb­
S suit where an adversary sought to use the amount of tax losses taken by a party; held such 
evidence was relevant, and ordered production); Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061­
63 (S.D. Texas 1978) (Rule IOb-5 action for rescission of a real estate investment; held 
evidence of tax consequences relevant and admissible); Berg v. Xerxes-SouthdaIe Office 
Bldg. Co., 290 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1980) (action under state securities law for fraud in 
a commercial real estate investment, court stated income tax considerations may preclude 
recovery). 
Others have excluded evidence of tax benefits: Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 
837-38 (9th Cir. 1984) (action under state and federal securities law for fraud in a cattle tax 
shelter investment, court excluded evidence of tax benefits); Freschi v. Grand Coal Ven­
ture, 588 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-60 (S.D.N.Y 1984) (action for damages under state law and 
Rule IOb-5; held an investor's tax savings should not be deducted from his damage recov­
ery); Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982) (action for 
rescission under federal securities law; held that the defendants were not entitled to a credit 
for tax benefits); Rhode v. Hershberger Explorations, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 993, 994 (D. Minn. 
1972) (Rule 1Ob-5 action for a fraudulent oil well tax shelter promotion, court excluded 
evidence of tax benefits received); Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (action for rescission or damages under federal securities laws; held the 
defendants were not entitled to a reduction in damages for taxes saved); Cooper v. Hallgar­
ten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (federal securities law action for rescis­
sion; held that the plaintiffs' income tax returns were not relevant to the subject of 
damages). 
2. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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any recovery in a Rule lOb-53 real estate tax shelter fraud case, where 
rescission is impossible, must be reduced by the amount of tax benefits 
accrued to the plaintiffs. This note, in Part I, will define the operative 
law which must be considered in any Rule lOb-5 real estate tax shelter 
litigation. Part II will consider the specific arguments raised in Salcer. 
Finally, in Part III, the note will consider the result reached by the 
court in Salcer and postulate a more expedient one.4 
I. THE OPERATIVE LAW 
Three areas of substantive law affect litigation involving real es­
tate tax shelters: income tax law, partnership law, and securities law. 
The Joint Commission on Internal Revenue Taxation has defined a 
real estate tax shelters as an "investment in which a significant portion 
of the investor's return is derived from the realization of tax savings on 
other income as well as the receipt of tax-free cash flow from the in­
3. The plaintiffs brought suit under SEC Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
The action was also brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I 
§ 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982)): 
MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE DEVICES 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commmerce or of the mails, or of any facil­
ity of any national securities exchange. . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange, or any security not so registered, any 
manipUlative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
For a discussion of the history of Rule 10b-5, see Note, Rule lOb-5 Damages: The Runaway 
Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 76, 76-79 (1975). 
4. See infra notes 71-127 and accompanying text. 
5. The tax shelter has come under increasing attack in recent years, with one com­
mentator stating: "Tax shelters will be the Achilles heel of the federal income tax if the 
Administration and the Congress do not move promptly to bring them under control." 
Calkins and Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAW. 493, 519 (1973); see generally Com­
ment, Auditing Partnership Tax Shelters: IRS Procedures and Taxpayer Liability, 60 NEB. 
L. REV. 564-, 564-65 (1981). 
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vestment itself."6 A tax shelter investor seeks to benefit from a ven­
ture through cash flow, tax benefits, and appreciation in equity value, 
which results in conversion of ordinary income into capital gain.7 
The real estate tax shelter normally arises in the partnership con­
text. The partnership is of particular interest to highly compensated 
individuals because losses may be passed through the partnership and 
used to offset each partner's individual income. 8 Each partner may 
take his or her share of the partnership losses to the extent of his or 
her adjusted basis in the partnership interest.9 In real estate shelters, 
these artificial losses may be greatly increased by the partner's share of 
nonrecourse financing. 10 Utilizing this method, a partner may be able 
6. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., TAX SHELTERS: REAL ESTATE I (l975)[hereinafter cited as TAX SHELTERS]' 
7. Id. at 2. 
8. Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "A partnership as such shall 
not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as 
partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities." 
I.R.C. § 701 (1982). Profit or loss is first determined jointly at the partnership level. This 
profit or loss is then distributed to the individual partners, and finally included in each 
partner's individual taxable income. The type of profit or loss is defined further by 
§ 702(b). It provides that the character of any item required to be separately stated by 
paragraphs (I) through (7) of § 702(a) must be the same as if it were realized by the partner 
directly from the source from which it was realized by the partnership. I.R.C. § 702(b) 
(1982). 
9. A partner's share of the partnership losses is determined by the partnership agree­
ment. I.R.C. § 704(a) (1982). It provides: "A partner's distributive share of income, gain, 
loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, be determined 
by the partnership agreement." Id. Section 704(d) limits the amount of losses a partner 
may take to his adjusted basis in the partnership interest; "[a1 partner's distributive share of 
partnerhip loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted 
basis of such partner's interest in the partnership ..." I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982). A further 
limitation is imposed by § 704(b) which requires the distributive share allocation to have 
"substantial economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982); see A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. 
POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION chs. 82-83 (1985). 
10. Section 465(a)(I) generally permits a partner to take losses "only to the extent of 
the aggregate amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at risk." I.R.C. § 465(a)(I) 
(1982). A taxpayer is considered "at risk" with respect to amounts including "(A) the 
amount of money and the adjusted basis of other property contributed by the taxpayer to 
the activity, and (B) amounts borrowed with respect to such activity (as determined under 
paragraph (2»." 1.R.c. § 465(b)(I) (1982). A taxpayer is considered "at risk" for amounts 
borrowed only to the extent he "(A) is personally liable for the repayment of such amounts, 
or (B) has pledged property, other than property used in such activity, as security for such 
borrowed amount ...." I.R.C. § 465(b)(2) (1982). Therefore, a nonrecourse loan (a loan 
for which the borrower is not personally liable) generally cannot increase a taxpayer's ad­
justed basis for the purpose of generating losses, because the amount of the loan is not "at 
risk." However, real estate borrowings, by virtue of § 465(c)(3)(D), are not subject to the 
"at risk" limitations. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982). Thus, a real estate limited partnership 
investment can still generate extensive artificial losses without the risk of personal liability. 
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to deduct losses well in excess of his or her personal investment. I I Be­
cause limited partners are generally not personally liable for obliga­
tions of the partnership,12 the majority of real estate tax shelters are 
limited partnerships. 13 It is the combination of substantial income tax 
benefits and personal gain coupled with limited personal liability that 
makes the real estate limited partnership investment so attractive. 
The third operative area of law to consider in tax shelter litigation 
is securities law. For purposes of federal securities law, the Supreme 
Court has defined a security as any "contract, transaction or scheme 
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is 
lead to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third 
party...."14 Because a real estate limited partnership investor is led 
to expect profits solely through the activities of the general partner, 
and limited partners are generally prohibited from interfering with 
11. The following example shows how such a scenario might operate: 
A hypothetical real estate partnership might show a $50,000 loss in one year. 
Assume that this loss was obtained by taking the difference between $60,000 of 
deductible depreciation and $10,000 of gross rents in excess of operating expenses 
and interest. If the mortgage amortization, a nondeductible expense, were $2,000, 
then the partnership would have a positive cash flow of $8,000. If under the 
partnership agreement one limited partner were entitled to 50% of partnership 
losses and 37.5% of the cash flow, that partner would receive $3,000 in cash, but 
his tax return would reflect only his share of the partnership's net loss, or 
$25,000. 
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173-74 & n.6 (1982), (citing Note, Real Estate Lim­
ited Partnerships and Allocational Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue for Securities Fraud, 63 
VA. L. REV. 669, 673 n.22 (1977» [hereinafter cited as The Incentive to Sue]. 
12. U.L.P.A. §§ 1 & 7; R.U.L.P.A. § 303. Practitioners should note that an organi­
zation which may appear to be a partnership to the parties involved may not be a partner­
ship to the IRS. The Service defines partnership as a "syndicate, group, pool, joint venture 
or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, financial 
operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust 
or estate or a corporation." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1982); see also § 761(a) (1982). 
On the other hand, a corporation is defined to include "associations, joint-stock com­
panies, and insurance companies." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1982). For further clarification the 
regulations provide six characteristics of a pure corporation: (1) associates; (2) an objective 
to carry on business; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited 
liability; and (6) transferability of interest. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1984). In deciding 
whether an organization is a corporation or a partnership, the first two of these are elimi­
nated because they are common to both, and the judgment is made on the basis of the four 
subsequent characteristics. So long as an enterprise does not have more than two of these 
four corporate characteristics, the regulations state the enterprise is a partnership for in­
come tax purposes. Id. For further consideration see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 
729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Commissioner v. Larsen, 66 T.C. 159 (1976); and Rev. Rul. 79-106, 
1979-1 C.B. 448. 
13. E. BRODSKY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TAX SHELTER LITIGATION 14 (1978). 
14. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); see Jacobs, The Meaning 
ofSecurity Under Rule JOb-5, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 211, 213-33 (1984). 
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partnership operations,15 the limited partnership interest is a secur­
ity,16 and therefore is subject to federal securities laws.17 Rule lOb-5 
gives substantial protection to investors in securities. IS It broadly pro­
15. Under § 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been enacted in 
28 states and the District of Columbia, a limited partner's liability remains limited to his 
investment unless he takes part "in the control of the business." UNIF. LIMITED PARTNER­
SHIP ACT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969). Section 10(1) provides several very limited activities 
that a limited partner may perform without participating "in the control of the business"; 
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the principal place of business ofthe part­
nership, and at all times inspect and copy any of them. 
(b) Have on demand true and full information of all things affecting the partner­
ship affairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable, and 
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of court. 
UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 10(1), 6 U.L.A. 590 (1969). Section 303(a) of the 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been enacted in 22 states, also re­
stricts a limited partner from taking part "in the control of the business." REVISED UNIF. 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 245-46 (Supp. 1985). Section 303(a) per­
mits a limited partner to participate in several well-defined activities of the partnership 
without participating in the control of the partnership, and thus without losing his limited 
partner status. Id. 
16. SEC regulations and judicial decisions support this conclusion. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 24O.3all-l (1985)("The term 'equity security' is hereby defined to include any stock or 
similar security, certificate of interest or ... limited partnership interest ...."); SEC v. 
Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 137 (7th Cir. 1982)("There is no dispute that the limited partner­
ship interests constituted securities."); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 
1980)("a limited partnership generally is a security, ... because, by definition, it involves 
investment in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."); 
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1978)("the very legal requirements for 
a limited partnership necessitate its including all of the attributes of a 'security' in the 
interest bestowed upon one of limited partners."). 
17. See, e.g., GUIDE 5 Preparation 0/Registration Statements Relating to Interests in 
Real Estate Limited Partnerships, SEC Release No. 33-6405, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
3829 (1983) (a guide promulgated by the SEC to regulate requirements for registration 
statements). 
18. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had as a primary purpose full disclosure. 
See S. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., lst Sess. 1 (quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 
(1953)). Rule lOb-5 is based on the expectation that all investors should have "relatively 
equal access to material information." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 
(2d Cir. 1968). The rule has been called the most important securities provision in the 
United States securities laws. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, § 1 at 1-4 (1980). 
Courts have traditionally sought to interpret the rule broadly. Because this note considers 
Rule lOb-5 only peripherally as a fraud provision through which an injured investor may 
seek damages, its requirements for recovery and other applications will not be considered. 
These issues have been discussed in great detail by others. See, e.g., 5 A. JACOBS, THE 
IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 (1980) (contains a general discussion of the Rule lOb-5 action, its 
possible applications, and recognized remedies); Ruder & Cross, Limitaitons on Civil Lia­
bility Under Rule JOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125 (considers the limiting elements of a Rule 
lOb-5 civil action); Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes 0/ the Beholder: Rule JOb-5's Application to 
Acts o/Corporate Management, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674 (1972) (discusses Rule lOb-5's role 
as a regulator of corporate management); Leader, Threshold Prerequisites to Securities 
Fraud Class Actions, 48 TEX. L. REV. 417 (1970) (applies federal class action requirements 
to Rule lOb-5 and other securities fraud provisions); Note, Retributive or Remedial: What is 
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hibits using the mails or interstate commerce to engage in fraudulent 
acts "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"19 and 
thus it provides safeguards well in excess of those provided for by 
common law fraud protections. 
II. SALCER 
A. The Facts 
In Salcer, the plaintiffs were limited partners in Greenspoint As­
sociates, a limited partnership established to construct and manage an 
apartment complex.20 The defendants were the general partners of 
Greenspoint Associates, a 308-unit apartment complex located outside 
the city of Houston.21 Plaintiffs purchased their interests based on 
sales literature developed by the defendants.22 The literature indicated 
that the investment would be appropriate only for persons subject to 
high rates of taxation.23 
Problems arose when the city of Houston annexed the land in­
volved in September 1981.24 As a result, there was a forced sale of the 
property, and each of the purchasers received a substantial loss on the 
investment.25 
At this point, the plaintiffs commenced an action in the district 
court for the Southern District of New York under section 1O(b)(5) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 and SEC ~~l~ 1O~~.27 ~The_~ ____ 
the Objective 0/Imposing Criminal Sanctions in Section lO(b) Actions under the 1934 Securi­
ties Exchange Act?, 8 J. CORP. L. 527, 529 & n.22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Criminal 
Sanctions in 10(b) Actions] (examines the possible criminal penalties involved in Rule lOb-5 
violations); Comment, A Role/or the lOb-5 Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 460 (1981) 
(focuses on the necessary role of Rule lOb-5 private actions in securities fraud litigation). 
19. See supra note 3. 
20. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 937. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. The purchase price of each unit of the limited partnership was $77,500. The 
literature provided to the plaintiffs included an October 1977 private placement memoran­
dum and a financial analysis sheet dated October 19, 1977. The literature stated that the 
Greenspoint Project was to be a 308-unit complex in Harris County Texas, just outside the 
Houston City limits. Id. 
23. [d. Specifically, the memorandum stated: 
[I]nvestment in the Units is suitable only for persons of adequate financial means 
who have no need for liquidity with respect to their investment. Only persons 
whose income is subject to high rates of income taxation will derive the full eco­
nomic benefit of the intended tax benefits of this offering. 
Id. 
24. Id. at 938. 
25. Id. From the sale, each plaintiff received $30,000 per unit, $47,500 short of their 
investment. Id. 
26. See supra note 3. 
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plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew or should have known, and 
failed to disclose, that the city of Houston was planning to annex the 
land on which the Greenspoint Project was to be built,28 As a result, 
costs should have been expected to rise substantially.29 
The defendants answered, claiming affirmatively that each plain­
tiff had realized tax benefits in excess of his loss on the investment.3o 
In August 1983, the plaintiffs made a motion pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(c), 12(f) and/or 56 to strike these affirmative 
defenses. 3 I At the close of oral argument, the district court judge 
granted the 12(f) motion.32 The defendants then sought an interlocu­
27. See supra note 3. 
28. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 937. 
29. Id. Costs could be expected to rise due to (1) the imposition of water, sewer, and 
building permits, certificates of occupancy, taxes; (2) additional construction requirements 
such as water and sewer lines; (3) additional roofing, plumbing and electrical work neces­
sary to comply with Houston's building code; and (4) a delay in completion that might 
jeopardize the project's financing. Id. at 937-38. 
30. Id. at 938. The defendants reached this conclusion based on the assumption that 
each plaintiff was taxed at a marginal rate of at least 50 per cent, an assumption the plain­
tiffs did not challenge. Id. 
31. Rule 12( c) states: 
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for a judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made per­
tinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Rule 12(f) states: 
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon 
the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or 
scandalous matter. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). Rule 56 states in pertinent part: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hear­
ing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forth­
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
32. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 938. Rule 12(f) is the "primary procedure for objecting to 
an insufficient defense." 5 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE § 1380 (1969). Its most important application is when the parties' primary disagree­
ment is about the legal implications of a defense, not controverted facts. Id. at § 1381. 
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tory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b),33 which was 
granted.34 
B. The District Court's Opinion 
In granting the plaintiffs' Rule 12(f) motion, the district court 
stated that although "tax considerations come into this case in deter­
mining whether there was in fact a fraud committed,"35 it would 
make "no sense to say that any loss to the defrauded investor and 
hence, any gain or recovery which he is entitled to should be reduced 
by the tax benefits that he realized."36 
Judge Broderick, the district court judge, reasoned that the tax 
benefits would have been realized regardless of whether there was a 
fraud. 37 The investors could have invested in a different enterprise, 
realized similar tax benefits, and not have suffered due to the alleged 
Greenspoint fraud. 38 Realizing that the issue of tax benefit reduction 
was of critical importance to the case, Judge Broderick certified the 
issue as appropriate for review. 39 
C. The Second Circuit's Opinion 
In the appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs were joined by 
the SEC and the Department of Justice Tax Division which both filed 
amicus curiae briefs. The arguments of each party will be considered 
individually. - -- - - - - - ­
1. The Plaintiffs 
The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that reduc­
tion of the award by the amount of tax benefits received would make 
33. The section reads: 

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeala­

ble under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control­

ling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of 

opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 

ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. 

The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be 

taken from such order. . . . 

28 U.S.c. § 1292(b) (1982). 
34. Sa/cer, 744 F.2d at 938. Since the issue of reduction of the recovery by tax bene­
fits was critical, and the plaintiffs indicated they would drop the suit if they received an 
adverse ruling, the court granted the defendants' motion. Id. at 938-39. 




39. Id. See supra note 33. 
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"the government the banker for fraudulent tax shelter activity."40 In 
Burgess v. Premier Corp.,41 the Ninth Circuit ruled that tax benefits in 
tax shelter fraud litigation should be ignored. The Burgess court rea­
soned that the promoters of the fraudulent investment, not the taxpay­
ers, should bear the burden of the losses.42 According to Burgess, any 
double benefit to the plaintiff would be avoided by application of the 
tax benefit rule.43 
Judge Mansfield, the court of appeals judge, distinguished Bur­
gess by reasoning that in Salcer the government had already received 
its end of the bargain. The residential development which the tax in­
centives were designed to encourage had occurred.44 He stated further 
that the court was bound by section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act,45 which limits a plaintiirs recovery to "actual damages,"46 and 
therefore was compelled to consider the tax benefits the plaintiffs had 
bargained for and received.47 
2. 	 The Securities and Exchange Commission 
Joined by the plaintiffs, the SEC in its amicus brief argued that 
the tax benefits should not be considered because they fall within the 
collateral source rule.48 The collateral source rule prohibits considera­
tion of benefits received from third parties as a result of separate trans­
actions.49 Under Rule lOb-5, however, courts have ruled that benefits 
resulting directly from the transaction under scrutiny must be consid­
40. 	 Id. at 941, (quoting Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (1984)). 
41. 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984). 
42. 	 Id. at 838. 
43. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 98-111 for an explanation of the tax benefit 
rule. 
44. 	 Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941. 
45. 	 Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads: 
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any 
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person 
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter 
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total 
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. . . . 
48 Stat. 903 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78bb(a) (1982)); see 3 L. Loss, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1624-32 (1961). 
46. 	 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
47. 	 Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941. 
48. 	 Id. 
49. Generally, the rule states that "[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the 
injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although 
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (2) (1979). The comments provide that the collateral source 
rule normally applies to insurance policies, employment benefits, gratuities, and social leg­
islation benefits. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A comment (c)(I)-(4) (1979). 
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ered.50 With this standard in mind, the court held that the tax benefits 
were too closely related to the transaction which led to the loss to be 
excluded by the collateral source rule. 51 The court, concerned that the 
plaintiffs might receive an undeserved windfall, 52 rejected the argu­
ment for application of the collateral source rule, finding the tax bene­
fits an inextricable part of the real estate tax shelter investment. 53 
The SEC argued further that the plaintiffs' recovery should not be 
reduced by tax benefits, because such benefits are the equivalent of pre­
judgment interest.54 The purpose of pre-judgment interest is to com­
pensate a party for the loss of the use of his money.55 Any recovery, 
the SEC argued, would merely be compensation for any gain the plain­
tiffs could have accrued with their investment had they gone else­
where. The court quickly disposed of this argument on two grounds: 
(1) the tax benefits would be an unreasonably large amount of pre­
judgment interest,56 and (2) treatment of tax benefits as pre-jUdgment 
interest was unnecessary. 57 
3. The Tax Division 
The Department of Justice Tax Division argued that tax benefits 
should not be considered because the tax benefits in any case may be 
illusory.58 The division relied on Burgess v. Premier Corp.,59 and 
Western Federal Corp. v. Davis,60 which held that because amended 
returns may have to be filed under the tax benefit rule, any economic 
50. Jacobs, The Measure ofDamages in Rule JOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1159 
(1977); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dividends); 
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 44 (10th Cir. 1971) (dividends or profits), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1071 (1971) 
51. Saicer, 744 F.2d at 941-42. 
52. Id. at 942. Specifically, the court stated: 
Assuming proof that the $77,500 investment per unit was induced by fraud, not 
only would they [the plaintiffs] retain the $97,866 already received per unit 
($30,000 upon liquidation plus $67,866 tax savings) but they would gain another 
$47,500 (i.e., the difference between the $77,500 paid per unit and the $30,000 per 
unit received upon liquidation) for a total of $145,366. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1160; see also Cant V. A. G. Becker & Co., 384 F. Supp. 
814,815 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (pre-judgment interest is awarded if plaintiff is denied the use of 
his money). 
56. Saicer, 744 F.2d at 942. In the court's view, the use of the plaintift's $77,500 
investment for two years was clearly not worth the $63,866 of tax benefits the plaintiffs 
claimed as pre-judgment interest. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. /d. 
59. 727 F.2d 826. 
60. 553 F. Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982). 
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benefit due to tax deductions is illusory.61 Judge Mansfield, writing 
for the Second Circuit, stated that the chance or possibility of a chal­
lenge and subsequent inclusion does not justify the proposition that 
those tax benefits should be ignored.62 Since the IRS has had ample 
time to act and has not done so, the court will act as though no chal­
lenge is anticipated.63 
Finally, the Tax Division argued that the tax benefit rule should 
prevent the court from considering the tax consequences.64 The tax 
benefit rule requires a taxpayer who takes a deduction and later ob­
tains a recovery to include the amount of that recovery in ordinary 
income.65 Under this theory, the government argued that rescission­
ary damages recovered would amount to a recovery of the purchase 
price, putting the plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had 
they never owned the limited partnership interest. Such a recovery, 
inconsistent with their claimed deductions, would force them to claim 
the recovery as ordinary income.66 Actual rescission, if it had been 
possible in this case, would have forced the Greenspoint general part­
ners (the defendants) to repurchase the limited partners' (plaintiffs) 
shares in the project. 
The court responded to this argument by noting that actual re­
scission was impossible in this case, because the project had already 
been sold.67 Where actual rescission is unavailable, rescissionary dam­
ages may be awarded.68 The court concluded that under a rescission­
ary damage theory, the tax benefit rule has no application.69 
4. The Court's Conclusion 
Although the issue was raised in the context of a motion to strike, 
which theoretically would not force the court to reach a particular 
61. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838; Western Federal, 553 F. Supp. at 820. 
62. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 942. In order to justify such a treatment, the plaintiffs would 
have to show evidence that the deductions were improperly taken. Id. 
63. Id. at 942-43. 
64. Id. at 943. 
65. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
66. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. This is similar to what happened in Burgess, where the 
tax shelter involved the purchase and sale of cattle. In Burgess, the remedy of actual rescis­
sion was still available, however, because the fraudulent party could still be forced to repur­
chase the livestock. Burgess, 727 F.2d 826. 
67. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. 
68. See generally Jacobs, supra note 50, at 1118. Traditionally, rescissionary dam­
ages have been awarded in the corporate securities area where a shareholder has been de­
frauded. Because the defrauded investor's shares could not be replaced, he would be given 
the value of those shares. This damage recovery is termed rescissionary damages. 
69. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. 
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decision, Judge Mansfield made it clear that any damage award the 
plaintiffs would recover must be reduced by any tax benefits received. 
The result of this holding was to force the plaintiffs to drop their 
action.70 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Actual Damages 
It is essential to begin a consideration of this case with an under­
standing of what damages are recoverable for fraud under the Securi­
ties Exchange Act. In a Rule lOb-5 case, the primary place to tum for 
guidance in determining damages is section 28(a) of the 1934 Act,71 
The language of section 28(a) limits recovery to actual damages.72 At 
the time the Securities Exchange Act was enacted, "actual damages" 
had an accepted meaning.73 In Birdsall v. Coolidge, the Supreme 
Court stated, "Compensatory damages and actual damages mean the 
same thing; that is, that the damages shall be the result of the injury 
alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely 
commensurate with the injury suffered ...."74 In Osofsky v. ZipJ,75 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the purpose of sec­
tion 28(a) is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as 
a result of wrongs committed in violation of the 1934 ACt."76 The 
court's function, then, is to model a remedy best suited to fit the 
harm.77 This measure may include "out-of-pocket loss, the benefit-of­
the-bargain or some other appropriate standard. "78 
B. The Benefit-of-the-Bargain Measure 
Although the benefit-of-the-bargain 79 measure has been awarded 
70. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra note 45. 
73. Gamatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977). 
74. 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876). 
75. 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981). 
76. Id. at 111. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at Ill. In addition, although § 28(a) clearly does not authorize an award of 
punitive damages, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968), courts have held 
that punitive damage awards under state law may be awarded on a pendent state claim, 
even when suit is brought under § 28(a). Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 
1974); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972). 
79. The benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages permits the plaintiff to recover 
the difference between the value of the securities and the value that was represented by the 
defendant. Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded 
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 381 (1974); accord Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1108-09 ("the 
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under section 28(a),80 it would be an inappropriate measure in this 
case. The benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages permits the 
plaintiff to recover the difference between the value of the securities 
and the value that was represented by the defendant. An award of 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages is only appropriate when such damages 
can be proved with reasonable certainty.81 There is no reasonable ba­
sis to judge what amount could have been earned on the Greenspoint 
Project had the investors not been defrauded. Any estimate would be 
too speculative and cause the court to reject the benefit-of-the-bargain 
measure.82 
C. The Out-ol-Pocket Measure 
The out-of-pocket measure of damages is preferable for the situa­
tion in Salcer. This is the traditional measure of damages in Rule lOb­
S cases.83 Under this method, the plaintiff should recover the differ­
ence between the value of what he received in the transaction and the 
security's purchase price.84 Therefore, the plaintiffs should be entitled 
to an amount equal to their original investment, less the amount they 
received on the forced sale.85 
Once a court determines that some recovery is warranted, the 
next problem is how the plaintiffs should recoup their investment. It 
would be naive to suggest that the tax consequences should not play 
some part in this decision. As the court stated in Bridgen v. Scott,86 
plaintiff's damages equal the difference between the value as represented by the defendant 
and the fair value"). 
80. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970) (in certain cases involv­
ing fraud and mergers "[w]here the defect in the proxy solicitation relates to the specific 
terms of the merger, the district court might appropriately order an accounting to ensure 
that the shareholders receive the value that was represented as coming to them"); Osojsky, 
645 F.2d at 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (stockholders who were fraudulently induced to vote for 
merger may recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages). 
81. Osojsky, 645 F.2d at 114; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) 
(1977). 
82. See Osojsky, 645 F.2d at 114. Dobbs has proferred another reason to reject this 
measure of damages. Rule lOb-5 securities fraud cases are likely to involve a substantial 
number of potential claimants. If each receives what he or she was promised, the value of 
the stock in the hands of other innocent parties may be seriously impaired. D. DOBBS, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 615 (1973). In this case, however, we are dealing 
with a limited number of holders, so this problem is not present. 
83. See. e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Sarlie v. 
E. L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(a) (1977). 
85. Plaintiffs' original investment was $77,500; they received $30,000 at the forced 
sale. Therefore, if we disregard the tax benefits received, the plaintiffs should recover 
$47,500. 
86. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978). 
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asking the jury to consider a tax shelter case without permitting them 
to consider the tax consequences would be "requiring the jury and the 
Court to live in an artificial 'never-never land.' "87 
The Salcer and Austin courts accounted for the tax consequences 
by reducing any recovery by the amount of tax benefits received.88 To 
decide whether this is an expedient result, it should be considered in 
light of the three parties involved. First, the plaintiffs are compen­
sated to the extent of their out-of-pocket loss. This seems just. Sec­
ond, the defendants may incur no loss as a result of their fraudulent 
actions, a result that does not deter the defendants or others from 
committing similar acts.89 Third, the government is left to bear a por­
tion of the cost of the defendants' fraud through tax benefits to the 
plaintiffs. 
Although there is merit to the court's argument that the govern­
ment has already received the benefit it bargained for,90 it is still inex­
pedient for the government to act as "the banker for fraudulent tax 
shelter activity."91 The defendants are not paying the damages; the 
government is paying. One purpose of the securities acts is certainly 
prevention and deterrence, especially if the wrongdoer was conscious 
of his actions.92 At least one jurisdiction has ruled that deterrence is 
the primary motive behind the securities acts.93 That purpose is not 
being furthered by allowing government tax benefits to replace defend­
ant liability. Considering the three parties involved, the Salcer result 
is inexpedient because it leaves the government to bear the cost of the 
defendant's fraudulent activity. 
87. Id. at 1061. 
88. Austin, 675 F.2d 168; Salcer, 744 F.2d 935. 
89. A central purpose behind Rule 10b-5 and the securities acts is the protection of 
investors through full disclosure. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Unless 
the fraudulent defendants are punished, others are not deterred from similar deceptive 
practices. To achieve this end, any fraud provisions of the securities acts are construed 
broadly. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 795 (6th Cir. 1967). "Of course, 
it is well recognized that the securities and exchange legislation has broad remedial pur­
poses for protection of the investing public and should be liberally construed." Id. 
90. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941. 
91. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. 
92. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933). 
93. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. SUpp. 544, 567 (E.D.N.Y 
1971); Note, Ancillary Reliefin SEC Injunction Suits/or Violation ofRule JOb-5, 79 HARV. 
L. REV. 656, 663-65 (1966). In some cases criminal penalties may be imposed. Under 
section 32(a) of the 1934 Act "any person who willfully violates any provision of the chap­
ter" may be subject to criminal penalties. 48 Stat. 904 (1934)(codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982». The purpose behind section 32(a) is to punish the individual and 
deter others from committing similar acts. Criminal Sanctions ill Section JO(b) Actions, 
supra note 18, at 540. 
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Since the Salcer court's measure of damages is not the most expe­
dient one, a more appropriate alternative should be sought. The alter­
native chosen by the district court in Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture 94 
was to allow recovery without regard to the plaintiff's tax benefits.95 
The district court stated that such a result is equitable because under 
the tax benefit rule any recovery will be included in the plaintiff's in­
come. As previously stated, the tax benefit rule requires a taxpayer 
who takes a deduction and later obtains a recovery to include the 
amount of that recovery in ordinary income for the year of recovery to 
the extent of the deductions taken.96 The court in Freschi went on to 
note that were the tax benefit rule to be ignored, "the losers would be 
the government and plaintiffs, and the only winner would be 
defendants."97 
D. The Tax Benefit Rule 
The court in Salcer maintained that the tax benefit rule would not 
apply to the facts of this case. The court stated that because rescissio­
nary damages are not the "same as rescission"98 and are not "inconsis­
tent with the plaintiff's prior tax position,"99 an award of such 
damages would not result in application of the tax benefit rule. Under 
the tax benefit rule, only recoveries fundamentally inconsistent with 
earlier deductions must be included as income in the current year. 100 
A thorough examination will show the court applied the rule 
incorrectly. 
Application of the tax benefit rule is essential in this case; without 
it a recovery by the plaintiffs would not be taxed. To determine 
whether a court award of damages is to be taxed as income, it is criti­
cal to look at the nature of the action settled.101 It has long been set­
tled that if the basis of the recovery is an injury to capital, then the 
recovery is not taxed as income.102 If, however, the recovery is for loss 
94. 588 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
95. Id. at 1260. 
96. Although the tax benefit rule was created in the courts, it has been given the 
approval of Congress through the enactment of I.R.C. § 111 which limits the rule's applica­
tion. 1.R.c. § 111 (1982). 
97. Freschi, 588 F. Supp. at 1260. 
98. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. 
99. Id. 
100. See infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text. 
101. Carter's Estate v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 
U.S. 910 (1962). . 
102. Durkee V. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1947). 
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of profits, \03 or punitive damages,I04 then the recovery is taxable. The 
burden of proving that the settlement represents a recovery of capital 
rather than ordinary income rests with the taxpayer. \Os Because plain­
tiffs' claim for damages in Salcer is for recovery of their original capi­
tal investment, any monies received from adamage award would not 
be treated as income, and therefore would not be taxed. 
Since the recovery would not be taxed as income, the recovery 
will only be taxed if the tax benefit rule is applied. In Hillsboro Na­
tional Bank v. Commissioner, \06 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he 
basic purpose of the tax benefit rule is to achieve rough transactional 
parity in tax . . . and to protect the Government and the taxpayer 
from the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of as­
sumptions that an event in a subsequent year proves to be errone­
OUS."I07 Although not all recoveries will justify application of the tax 
benefit rule, \08 the recovery of a loss is the prototypical event that in­
vokes the rule. \09 In Hillsboro, the Supreme Court stated that if a later 
event is "fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the 
deduction was initially based,"lIO then the income from that transac­
tion will be included as income in the current taxable year. 11 1 
103. Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210, 211 (7th Cir. 1962). If the 
injury is for loss of profits, the claim also determines the nature of the income realized. 
Sanders v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629, 635 (10th Cir. 1955). 
104. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (money received as 
exemplary damages or the punitive two-thirds portion of an antitrust treble damage recov­
ery must be reported as income). 
105. Morse v. United States, 371 F.2d 474, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (court found gain 
realized from the sale of a partnership interest was a gain from the sale of a capital asset, 
rather than ordinary income). 
106. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
107. Id. at 383; see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
265, 270 (1978). 
108. As the Supreme Court stated: 
Not every unforeseen event will require the taxpayer to report income in the 
amount of his earlier deduction. On the contrary, the tax benefit rule will 'cancel 
out' an earlier deduction only when a careful examination shows that the later 
event is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was 
initially based. 
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383. 
109. See Bittker and Kanner, supra note 107 at 273. 
110. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383. 
Ill. Id. at 389. In his dissent, ~ustice Stevens criticized the Hillsboro majority for 
causing uncertainty in result and enlarging the tax gatherer's discretion to reexamine past 
transactions. Id. at 416. 
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E. Rescissionary Damages 112 
The question now becomes whether a recovery of rescissionary 
damages is inconsistent with the deductions taken by the plaintiffs. If 
such a recovery is inconsistent, then it would have to be included as 
income in the year recovered. As the Court of Appeals points out, if 
this were a case of actual rescission, the tax benefit rule would 
apply. 113 
Rescission revokes the bargain between the parties and attempts 
to return them to their prior position. 114 Rescissionary damages are 
awarded when actual rescission is no longer possible. liS Since the 
Greenspoint Project had already been sold, the option of rescission 
was foreclosed, and a rescissionary theory had to be employed. Gen­
erally, rescissionary damages equal the fair value paid, measured at the 
time of purchase, less the fair value paid at the time of sale. 116 Rescis­
sionary damages seek the same end as rescission, to place the plaintiffs 
in the position they would have been in had they never entered the 
bargain. In fact, courts use identical language in defining the two the­
ories of damages. Both seek to return the injured parties to the "status 
quo ante."117 
To state that an award of rescission is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the plaintiffs' deductions, and an award of rescissionary damages 
is not, is to elevate form over substance. Both yield the same result, 
for the same reasons, but utilize somewhat different means. It is a 
fundamental concept of taxation that substance should not be exalted 
over form. liS Application of the Code should never tum on "attenu­
112. This note consistently uses the term rescissionary damages. However, courts 
and commentators referring to this theory have used several terms: rescissionary. rescissory; 
and rescissional; Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943 rescissionary; Austin, 768 F.2d at 957 rescissory; 
Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1114 rescissional. 
113. The rule could apply to Burgess, 727 F.2d 826, where actual rescission oc­
curred. The court in Salcer is correct in pointing out that the court in Burgess incorrectly 
applied the rule. The plaintiffs in Burgess would not be required to amend their previous 
returns but would be required to include any recovery as income in the current year. 
Courts that have considered the issue of rescission and the tax benefit rule have not 
reached consistent results; see Note, Tax Consequences ofRescission: The Interplay Between 
Private and Public Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 562,575 & n.55 (1975). 
114. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 
(1968). 
ll5. Id. at 742 & n.18. 
ll6. See Jacobs, supra note 50 at Ill8-19. 
ll7. Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361; Myzel, 386 F.2d at 742. 
ll8. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572-73 (1978); Commissioner v. 
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 
(1935). In a myriad of factual situations, the courts, while applying the Code, have looked 
beyond the form of the transaction involved, and evaluated the substance to discern the 
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ated subtleties." 119 
Rescissionary damages attempt to return injured plaintiffs to the 
status quo ante. Any deductions taken by the plaintiffs must be consid­
ered fundamentally inconsistent with a recovery that places the plain­
tiff in a position equivalent to what they would have been in had the 
transaction never occurred. Interest deductions taken for loans con­
sidered to have never occurred,120 or depreciation deductions for 
projects considered to have never existed,121 must present a fundamen­
economic reality of the transaction. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 260, 291 (1946) 
(court determined no real partnership existed between husband and wife, and income was 
properly attributable solely to husband); O'Hare v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 
1981) (court held taxpayer was a guarantor in substance, not a joint venturer, and therefore 
held fees were ordinary income rather than capital gain); Republic Petroleum Corp. v. 
United States, 613 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1980) (taxpayer attempted to cloak assumption 
of a mortgage into a promissory note, the court looked to the substance of the transaction, 
and held taxpayer's intention could not have been anything other than to assume the mort­
gage); United States v. Kennedy Construction Co. of NSB Inc., 572 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 
1978) (contractor made advances to subcontractor for the specific purpose of paying wages 
to specific employees, court held substance of the transaction was a direct payment by 
contractor to subcontractor's employees, and thus contractor was liable for taxes which 
should have been withheld); Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(court held description of transaction as "part sale and part gift" or "net gift" had no effect 
on the substance of the transaction); Stahl v. United States, 441 F.2d 999, 1001 (D.e. Cir. 
1970) (court determined loan of securities to a securities firm was in substance a bailment, 
and did not create a debtor-creditor relationship); Comtel Corp. v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 
791, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (court held substance of transaction was a loan with security 
rather than a purchase and resale of stock, and hence taxpayer was forced to recognize 
ordinary income); Palmer v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 974,975 (1st Cir. 1965) (taxpayers 
transferred real property to a corporation wholly owned by them, and carried out a previ­
ously arranged sales contract, court held the sale was actually made by the taxpayers); 
Foxman v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 466, 469 (3d Cir. 1965) (court determined that transac­
tion between two partners to buyout third partner was in substance a purchase and sale for 
tax purposes rather than a liquidation of the retiring partner's interest); Estate of Smith v. 
Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1963) (court found substance of a partnership 
agreement was for employment services, and fees constituted payment for services and not 
a distributive share of partnership income); Garcia v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 491, 495 
(1983) (court held interim steps taken by the taxpayer did not preclude transaction from 
qualifying as an exchange of like kind property, when in substance the same result was 
intended and achieved); Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, 582 (1979) (taxpayer's 
characterization of payments as management fees was disallowed, because in substance 
payments were commissions); Johnson Investment & Rental Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.e. 
895,903 (1978) (taxpayer claimed payments were rent, court held substance of transaction 
indicated payments were actually mineral royalties); Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc. v. 
Commisssioner, 65 T.C. 640, 657 (1975) (court held cost ofleasehold improvements had to 
be amortized over useful life of improvements rather than lease period, because it was ap­
parent the length of lease term was indefinite). 
119. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930). 
120. Generally, an interest deduction is allowed for "all interest paid or accrued 
within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982). 
121. Reasonable depreciation deductions are permitted as an "allowance for exhaus­
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tal inconsistency. The tax benefit rule would require any rescissionary 
damage recovery by the plaintiffs to be included in income. In 
Freschi,122 the district court stated that were this application of the tax 
benefit rule to be ignored, "the losers would be the government and 
the plaintiffs, and the only winner would be the defendants."123 If a 
party is to benefit, "[i]t is more apppropriate to give the defrauded 
party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep 
them."124 
Reduction of damages by the tax benefits received also has the 
result of discouraging defrauded investors from suing. The Supreme 
Court has stated that the securities acts were designed to encourage 
private actions. 125 Furthermore, where federally secured rights are vi­
olated, courts are given wide latitude to "provide such remedies as are 
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."126 Given this 
discretion, it would be improvident to rely on the subtle distinction 
between rescission and rescissionary damages. In light of these con­
siderations, the more expedient rule would be to exclude evidence of 
tax benefits with the understanding that application of the tax benefit 
rule will result in the inclusion of the recovery in the plaintiff's income. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Salcer, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Rule 
lOb-5 damage award must be reduced by any tax benefits received by 
the plaintiff. 127 Although this rule is a reasonable one, it is not the 
most expedient. If we consider the interests of the plaintiffs, the de­
fendants, and the government, it is more appropriate to place the bur­
tion, wear and tear" on property "used in the trade or business," or "property held for the 
production of income." I.R.C. §§ 167(a)(I) & (2) (1982). 
122. 588 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D. N.Y. 1984). 
123. Id. at 1260. 
124. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) 
(quoted in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 
(1968». 
125. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Private actions provide "a 
necessary supplement" to actions by the government. "[T]he possibility of civil damages 
serves as a most effective weapon in enforcement. ..." Id. 
126. Id. at 433; the Supreme Court explained this principle: 

Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule 

from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant 

the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been 

invaded, and a federal statute provides a general right to sue for such invasion, 

federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. 

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). (citations omitted) 
127. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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den on the fraudulent parties, the defendants. Such a decision would 
prevent the court from reducing a damage award by the amount of tax 
benefits received. 
Mark W. Zeno 
